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President Tito's visit to the USSR

PRESIDENT TITO'S SPEECH AFTER THE VISIT TO THE USSR AND RUMANIA

Comrades,

Allow me first of all to thank you on behalf of the whole delegation for this magnificent welcome and to convey to you the cordial greetings from the people of the Soviet Union and from the Rumanian people.

We are returning from the visit which we paid to the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Soviet Government and from the visit to neighbouring Rumania.

I know that you have followed our journey and that you have read a lot about our sojourn in the Soviet Union. But I must say here and now that neither was it possible to describe all, nor will it be possible for me to express in words with what warmth and cordiality the Soviet people had received us wherever we went. What we experienced surpassed all our expectations. We were frequently profoundly touched by the cordiality of ordinary people, workers, citizens and peasants — kolkhozniki, old and young alike. All this made our three-weeks stay seem very short. Clearly all this shows with what joy the people of the Soviet Union welcomed the revival of friendly relations between us.

In our contacts with the Soviet citizens we came to the conviction that all that had taken place in 1948 was completely alien and inconceivable to them and that they had been afflicted with it as much as we. They want to have all that forgotten, and that the trying period which lasted several years should serve as a lesson for the future, so that nothing like it should ever happen again. Naturally, we shared these desires of the Soviet people to a full extent, at the same time conveying to them the wish of the Yugoslav people that cooperation between our two countries should be as fruitful as possible and our friendship as firm as possible.


We were also greatly impressed by the extraordinary technical advance of the Soviet Union in every respect. We saw large-scale construction going on, we saw many big factories, we saw extensive plains rich with wheat and other cultures. But as I have already said, we were impressed most of all by the Soviet man — the Soviet people on whose happy faces and in whose eyes one could read that they are conscious of their great prospects — that they are conscious builders of socialism.

From the talks we had with the Soviet working people, we could conclude that during the last few years a huge step forward had been made in their country and that now it had become clear to them what constituted the essence of that great impetus.

Comrades,

When speaking about the extraordinarily cordial welcome and encounters with ordinary Soviet people, it is important to emphasize also the extremely warm and comradely attitude of the highest and other Soviet leaders towards us, towards the members of our delegation. Of course, this has contributed to the most cordial atmosphere and mutual understanding in our talks, both on questions of our mutual relations and those which concern international matters. This had also provided for the issuing of SUCH a new and historically important declaration as that which was signed between our Governments and between the Communist Party of the





Soviet Union and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

You have read the declaration which was drawn up there. What could you see in it? You could see that it recorded an important step forward in the development and implementation of the so-called Belgrade declaration. Once again it emphasizes with complete clarity what our relations are and what they should be in the future. The essence of the matter lies in the fact that it has not only a very great significance for the relations between our two countries, but surpasses by far these frames and becomes a document which has an international character. The part of the declaration dealing with international problems shows that we are in agreement on many of the most important questions which concern the consolidation of peace and international cooperation, which concern relations between states and peoples, which concern peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems. Of course, the implementation of this very important historic declaration can best be served by the hitherto scored results of the Belgrade declaration — in everyday practice and in relations between our peoples, as well as on the international plane.

We are deeply convinced — and nobody can dissuade us from this — that the Soviet people and present Soviet leaders wish above all for the ensurance of peace in the world so that they might build their better future in peace. One can feel this fully only when one goes there, when one sees what these men are doing, how they are setting about it — and what they aspire to. We have seen it and satisfied ourselves that the Soviet people hold peace to heart above all else and that this aspiration of the people is also shared by the highest Soviet leaders.

Comrades,

Allow me now to dwell with a few words on how this visit of ours was viewed in the world, in various quarters. From the comments that have appeared so far in the foreign press one can see that the overwhelming majority views this visit positively and takes it for what it is — an important contribution to the consolidation of peace and expansion of international cooperation. But

a minority — I might say an insignificant section — either refuses to see this or sometimes malevolently interprets this visit as an allegedly revived grouping of communist forces against — as they put free world. I think that anyone who had followed our foreign policy for some years, can look upon this as an absurdity. For this visit is nothing but a logical implementation of our principled foreign policy — the policy of cooperation with all those countries which desire this, on the basis of equality and non-interference in to the internal of the other side, the policy of constant struggle for the victory of the idea which can and should prevent a new international conflict, and this means the policy of co-existence between states with different social systems.

Of course, it would be the greatest foolishness if friendly relations and cooperation were not to exist between countries which are building socialism. We never concealed the fact, and least of all are we doing it today that we are steadily following the path of construction of a new and juster social system — socialism. Therefore it is logical that we wish to have best possible relations with the countries which are heading for the same goal.

But does this mean now that we intend to spoil our relations with other countries, relations with the Western countries which we created over a long period, we might say in the course of a very difficult period for us? Of course not. We wish not only to preserve these good relations but even to expand them, as this is in the spirit of our policy of peaceful cooperation and active co-existence with countries which have a different, that is a capitalist system. Hence such and similar conjectures of some small circles, which can be said not only to dislike but to hate socialism, have no foundation in fact. On the other hand, I am aware that those in the capitalist countries who approve of our course and our creation of friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries do not all of them do so because they like socialism, but they are aware that there is no other way if we are to avoid a new catastrophe in the world and if we wish the countries to cooperate with one another such as they are. I think this attitude is the most correct for them to take.

No matter how anybody interpreted our journey, I am sure that sooner or later everyone will be convinced that it is a significant contribution to appeasement in the world and a guide to all those who are still at a loss how to facilitate international cooperation, understanding and removal of various elements which disturb peace generally speaking. I think that, the nervousness of some people is groundless and even harmful — and I consider that the new elements taking shape in the development of international relations, should be regarded with more realism.

It has been customary in the West to speak about the so-called iron curtain. Now, when that iron curtain does not exist, they themselves wish to fence themselves off with an iron curtain instead of being logical also in relation to themselves and of working towards the rapprochement with these peoples whom they used to describe and still do so occasionally, as living behind an „iron curtain“. I think there is something very serious — serious in the negative sense and, of course, harmful — in all this. It is the lack of good will, lack of readiness to establish some kind of mutual confidence between states, regardless of their social systems. The Soviet Union on its part has already given ample proof that it does not

ant war and that there is no danger of any act of aggression on its part.

Comrades, as I have already stated, we have laid firm foundations for our future relations, first in the Soviet Union and then in Rumania. In this connection I would like to express our intention to do the same also with other Eastern European countries. But here the question arises whether our relations with all these countries equally reached that stage at which cooperation such as I have described, can already be established. I should say that with some of them they have, and with some others they have not. In regard to those countries with which relations have not reached such a stage, I can say that this is no fault of their peoples, but the result of a certain hesitation, certain reservations of the individual leaders, who find it hard to say what should be said and who consider that if they said it, they would lose their prestige. I think this is a wrong attitude. Since this concerns Communists, I think that so far from losing prestige, their frankness and sincerity in expression their wish to establish friendly relations basing them on new foundations, better than before — would on the contrary improve their reputation both in their own countries and in the world generally. As far as we are concerned, I can say that we are ready for this and that they can always meet here with complete understanding, and this is indispensable, not only in relation to ourselves and to cooperation between countries which are building socialism, but also in a wider, international sense.

We already have very fruitful economic and cultural cooperation with practically all the countries which are building socialism, but political cooperation is lagging behind economic and cultural cooperation. We would like to fill this vacuum which still exists in the relations between us and some countries which are building socialism as soon as possible, so that we could say there is no difference in our friendly relations and cooperation with any of these countries.

Here I would like to say a few words about the fact that in our talks with Soviet leaders we also touched upon such important problems as economic cooperation. At this we met with a full understanding on the part of the responsible Soviet men and with their readiness to help Yugoslavia, on a sound basis, in overcoming her difficulties in the building of the country. This in the first place applies to considerably large credits on very favourable terms; this form suits us best and we would so wish to have them in our relations with other countries. Viewing the huge technical progress achieved in the USSR, we have satisfied ourselves that there are real possibilities for the Soviet Union to help Yugoslavia especially with the delivery of those capital goods which are very important for the further development of our construction and for the balancing of our payments. These matters are now being discussed in Moscow by the Yugoslav delegation and we believe that everything will be most favourably and successfully concluded.

I must emphasize that it would be wrong to suppose that during our sojourn, even the least attempt was made, on any side, to make us renounce our principles concerning equal relations and equal cooperation in the economic as well as in the political and cultural fields. We can say with conviction that all the twaddle spread abroad to the effect that we are allegedly again losing our independence and again falling into someone's hands, is simply a pure fabrication which is not worth speaking about. I can also say here that the Soviet leaders never

for a moment mentioned that we should weaken our relations with the Western countries either in the economic, (in the political or) in the cultural respect. On the contrary, their view coincides with ours — namely that such cooperation should be continued and expanded, as this can only benefit everybody and serve to the consolidation of peace and establishment of confidence among nations.

As regards foreign policy questions which were discussed in Moscow, I can say that in essential points our views were identical or quite close to each other — especially on the question of German unification, disarmament, European security and the role of the United Nations, more specifically with regard to making every effort to consolidate the uncertain situation in the Middle East etc.

With reference to the German problem, the view set forth in my Moscow speech was my personal view and the view of our Government. Of course, we were quite pleased to learn that the Soviet view on this matter is similar to ours. I wish to say in this connection that some nervous comments on this question have quite needlessly appeared in Western Germany to the effect that we have now altered our attitude towards this question and adopted the view of the Soviet leaders. I have set forth the same view which I voiced in Moscow more than once, even before the visit of Soviet leaders to Belgrade. This will be remembered by those responsible men in Western Germany to whom I have spoken, and this is also well-known from the writing of the press. Accordingly, there is no deviation on our part in this respect. We are firmly of the opinion that if we wish to set about the solving of such important problems, we must see the facts as they are, even though they be sometimes unpalatable for individuals who take a different attitude. We consider, I emphasize once more, that this is an affair of the German people, while it is the duty of everyone else to help reach a realistic solution as regards the unification of Germany, Comrades.

We were sorry to note, during our stay in the Soviet Union, that certain quarters and a section of the press in America opposed with irritation and bitterness to establish the best possible relations with the Soviet Union. Things went so far that even threats were uttered regarding the immediate stoppage of every assistance to Yugoslavia. You know that we were always expressing our gratitude for the assistance which the



American Government and people extend to Yugoslavia, but I must underline that we never consented to this aid being given us under any humiliating terms or under terms which might tie our hands in our independent foreign and internal policy. It was so in the past, and this goes also for the future. But, on the other hand, I must say that we all rejoiced when we had heard that the most responsible factors, the vast majority of the people in America regarded our visit to the Soviet Union in a different light and that, one might say, the overwhelming majority correctly understand our efforts to create the best and firmest ties with all countries, in keeping with the principles of our foreign policy, which are based on what is fundamental — on the striving to ensure peace for humanity, to establish equal and beneficial cooperation between all countries, regardless of their internal political systems and to take the path of the peaceful settlement of various controversial international problems.

Another problem, which has reappeared in the commentaries, and this not in a positive but for the most part in a negative sense, was the question of the Balkan Alliance. It has been written and said that the Balkan Alliance is now completely buried and that this was a subject of talks at the Moscow meeting. Yes, there had been talk of the Balkan Alliance in Moscow, — but it was we who raised the matter explaining the present-day character of this Alliance and the aims of the Balkan cooperation. We explained that its aim is not to charge at an open door, but to be the basis, and this it actually is, for a very useful friendly cooperation between the three countries which at one moment can give priority to the military side of this agreement. I think that the Balkan agreement as a basis for cooperation has lost nothing, but that its peaceful character is increasingly finding expression and that it is a contribution of the countries which have created it, to the establishment of the best possible relations with other countries and consolidation of peace in the world. Not a single word unfavourable to the spirit of that agreement was uttered during the talks in Moscow.

I think that there is a lack of realism, a lack of the dynamic viewing of the process of development of international relations, the process of general development in the world. I think that in this respect some people lag too much behind the events and look at things statically so that all that is new and better seems to them terrible, and they ascribe negative tendencies to it. Of course we cannot expect such individuals to take a dialectical view of the process of development of international relations, but we might at least expect them to take a more logical and realistic view, as practice has already shown the beneficial character of the new path — which has already been adopted by many, even larger countries — namely, that it is better policy to solve problems in a peaceful way rather than by aggravating them by cold war, and this means that the point has been reached when people reject the thought of squaring accounts by force of arms, as they have come to the conclusion that not a single people desire this, but that all wish peace which would enable them to devote themselves to creative work. On the other hand, we are pleased that in both Greece and Turkey the majority of comments were positive and that our visit to the Soviet Union was positively viewed — and this has fortified us in our belief that such positive tendencies will be ever stronger and that our friendship and cooperation will grow better and ever more fruitful.

Comrades,

I have spoken so far about our successful visit to the Soviet Union, but on our way to that country, Rumanian leaders expressed the wish that on our return journey we should also come for a state visit to Rumania. Shortness of time prevented us from agreeing to a longer period than three days, although they wished this. But we were nonetheless able to examine thoroughly all problems with the leaders of that neighbouring country: the problems of the past and of the present, as well those of the future generally, and to reach useful conclusion. We should also mention here the statement which was issued on this occasion — a statement which means not only a step forward but also constitutes the basis for the consolidation of our friendly relations and cooperation.

In Rumania too, there was talk about many problems of the economic as well as political and cultural nature. We satisfied ourselves that there exist very favourable conditions for the expansion of the commercial exchanges between the two countries and in some branches even for mutual and complementary technical aid. It was decided on principle that the two Governments should appoint commissions which will make a comprehensive examination of the possibilities and draw up elaboration for the construction of the Iron Gate water power station which would be of huge dimensions and of very great significance not only for the two countries but also for others.

Besides these questions, we spoke also about the national minority in Banat, in Rumania, which as a result of the 1948 breach landed in a very difficult situation when it was deported etc. Its members have now for the most part returned to their homes, while those who were imprisoned, have been released. The responsible factors in Rumania very resolutely and readily declared they will see that all this be set right — at least that people be allowed to return to their places of abode and that compensation be given them for the damage and loss caused to them originally.

These were about all the questions which we have discussed. We are deeply convinced that our cooperation will be very fruitful and that the friendly relations between our two countries, who have never been at war with each other, will be ever firmer.

The Rumanian people received us very warmly and cordially both on our way to the Soviet Union and when we arrived for a visit to Rumania. At every step they expressed sympathy towards our country and our people and we could see that they greatly deplored all that had happened in 1948 between the two countries.

Well, comrades, these are the principal results of our visit to the Soviet Union and Rumania.

I consider that the visit to the Soviet Union and Rumania is of great importance for future development and that it will have a very favourable effect on cooperation between nations not only in these parts but in the world generally. Of course, — and this is very important for us — it is particularly useful for the two countries that the past has been laid aside and that the application of the spirit of the Belgrade declaration has already shown that we have found sound foundations on which we can continue to build our friendly relations and cooperation and this, as is understandable, will contribute to a great extent to the consolidation of peace throughout the world.

JOINT YUGOSLAV — RUMANIAN STATEMENT

AT the invitation of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly and the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito stayed on an official visit to the Rumanian People's Republic from June 23 to 26, 1956. Visiting Rumania together with President Josip Broz Tito were Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council Edvard Kardelj, the Foreign Secretary Koča Popović, member of the Federal Executive Council Mijalko Todorović, and President of the Executive Council of the People's Republic of Croatia and member of the Federal Executive Council Josip Broz Blazević.

The visit passed in a friendly and cordial atmosphere.

During the visit the representatives of the two Governments carried out a wide exchange of opinions on the principal questions of the international situation and of the relations between the two countries. Taking part in the talks on the Yugoslav side were President Josip Broz Tito and the above-mentioned members of the Yugoslav Government delegation, and on the Rumanian side the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party and member of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, president of the Ministerial Council Chivu Cioba, First Deputy Premier Emil Bodnăres, First Deputy Premier Petru Borila, First Deputy Premier Alexandru Boghioros and Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigore Gheorgheasa.

On the Yugoslav side the talks were attended by the Yugoslav Ambassador to the Rumanian People's Republic Nikola Vujanović, Secretary General of the President of the Republic Joža Vilfan and State Under-Secretary Anton Ratuša, and on the Rumanian side by the Secretary of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly Avram Iancu, Deputy Foreign Minister Stefan Cleja and Rumanian Ambassador in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia Nicolaie Guina.

The talks were conducted in a spirit of cordiality, sincerity and mutual understanding.

I

As regards the international situation, both Governments have noted with satisfaction the process of the relaxation of international tension and have expressed their firm conviction that the direct contacts between statesmen and the method of negotiation constitute one of the most important means for the settlement of controversial issues between states, for the further improvement of the international situation, for the strengthening of mutual trust and cooperation between states.

The Yugoslav and Rumanian Governments have confirmed their devotion to the principles of the United Nations Charter and have expressed their satisfaction at

the consolidation of the United Nations' international role and its further development towards universality through the admission of new members, including the Rumanian People's Republic. Both Governments are agreed to support, within the framework of the United Nations, all actions aimed at promoting international cooperation in all spheres.

Both Governments fully agree that disarmament and the banning of weapons for mass annihilation constitute a first-rate problem for all nations and that all states, big and small alike, can and should make their contribution to the positive solution of that problem. Both Governments shall actively support and encourage every initiative aimed at the settlement of this question, which would at the same time create possibilities for the utilization of immense sources for the progress and wellbeing of peoples.

Both Governments have expressed their conviction about the need for unimpeded international trade, for liquidation of artificial barriers in commercial exchanges and strengthening of cultural exchanges, as the basis for progress and better international understanding. In the framework of the international economic cooperation, they consider it will be expedient and efficacious to extend economic and technical assistance to the under-developed areas of the world, on the basis of full equality and without military and political conditions. Both Governments will support the realization of such actions in the United Nations.

The Yugoslav and Rumanian Governments express their conviction that the policy of active and peaceful coexistence among all states, irrespective of their social and political systems, is necessarily being activated as the sole way towards the strengthening and development of international cooperation.

II

Regarding the relations between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of Rumania, both Governments have stressed with satisfaction that the relations between the two countries, which have



been seriously perturbed in the recent past, have very much improved in the course of the last few years and especially after the Belgrade declaration, and that they are continuing to develop and expand. They are resolved to exert joint efforts for the removal of the consequences of that perturbation and to ensure further development of cooperation in the interests of good neighbour relations and friendship between the peoples of the two socialist countries.

The significant results which have been accomplished in this direction have found expression in the re-establishment of a normal situation on the Yugoslav-Rumanian border by way of corresponding agreements and conventions, in the regulation of trade exchange as well as railway, river and air transport, by way of agreements, in the satisfactory solution of the question of obligations arising from liabilities during the last few years between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of Rumania, in the development of cultural exchanges, mutual visits of cultural and scientific workers etc.

The Yugoslav and Rumanian Governments have expressed their resolve to develop and strengthen the relations of cooperation between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic in the spirit of friendship, on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality, mutual respect and non-interference into internal affairs.

The two Governments consider that there exists a possibility for developing wider economic cooperation and for increasing the level of exchanges between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic, in respect to which both sides have in mind the conclusion of a long-term commercial agreement, and the economic organs will be entrusted with the task of preparing it.

As they agree that it is in the interest of both countries to utilize the water power sources of the Danube, the two Governments have decided to form a mixed commission of Yugoslav and Rumanian experts which will examine the possibilities for the joint construction of a water power station in the Iron Gates area.

With a view to developing exchange of scientific and technical experiences in order to help the advance-

ment of economy of the two countries, the two Governments have agreed to conclude a convention on scientific and technical cooperation.

The two Governments have agreed to stimulate the development of cultural exchanges, mutual acquaintance with artistic and literary creations, mutual visits of scientific and art workers and similar contacts, and have decided to conclude a cultural agreement with this object in view.

Mutual acquaintance will be ensured through visits of delegations, publications and information visits of tourists etc.

Both Governments have noted with satisfaction that contacts in various fields of social activity have been established between the peoples of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic.

Wishing to ensure the best possible mutual acquaintance and rapprochement, as well as exchange of socialist experiences, both sides will encourage and facilitate direct contacts and cooperation between political, trade union and other social organizations of the two countries.

Both Governments welcome the results which have been achieved during the visit of the Yugoslav Government delegation to the Rumanian People's Republic and express their belief that these talks and further contacts between the representatives of the two nations in various fields will contribute to a further expansion of cooperation and consolidation of friendly relations between the peoples of the two socialist countries.

The Governments of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian People's Republic consider that such development of their relations and cooperation between the two countries will serve the interests of their peoples and at the same time constitute a significant contribution to the cause of the consolidation of peace and cooperation in South-eastern Europe and in the world generally.

The joint statement was signed on behalf of the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, by Josip Broz Tito and on behalf of the Rumanian People's Republic, by Chivu Stoica.

COMMUNIQUE ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WORKERS PARTY OF RUMANIA

DURING the sojourn of the Yugoslav Government delegation in Bucharest, a frank and comradely exchange of views between the representatives of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party was carried out in a cordial atmosphere. The participants, on the Yugoslav side, were Secretary General of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Edvard

Kardelj and members of the Central Committee Jakov Blažević, Koča Popović and Mijalko Todorović, while on the Rumanian side the participants were First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party Gheorghiu-Dej, members of the Political Bureau of the CC Chivu Stoica, Emil Bodnareș, Petru Boriș Alexandru Moghioros, and member of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party Grigore Preteasa. Both sides are agreed that there exist the conditions and need for the establishment and develop-

of contacts and comradely cooperation between the two parties.

In order to accomplish this aim, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Rumanian Workers' Party will establish personal contacts and meetings between the representatives of the two parties, exchanges of information on the activity of the two parties, exchange of delegations and literature and arrange for other forms of contact which can contribute to the mutual

acquaintance with the views on questions of common interest.

In this connection the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has addressed a message to the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party, inviting it to send a delegation of the Rumanian Workers' Party to Yugoslavia. The Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party has accepted the invitation.

Opinions on Current Problems

NEW PROSPECTS OF DISARMAMENT

Stojan KOVAČEVIĆ

THE United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee concluded its spring session in London without any concrete results: after eight weeks of work, notwithstanding the significant developments which took place in the course of the session, it was finally noted that the big powers had once more failed to reach agreement; this has called forth a wave of disappointment throughout the world, at the time when the international situation is improved to such an extent so as to afford the best conditions yet for an agreement in this domain. Nevertheless there were no concrete results, in spite of the favourable atmosphere and the serious efforts of the Sub-Committee.

The reasons for the stalemate on the disarmament problem were publicly discussed after the Sub-Committee had adjourned. Different explanations were tendered from different sources, but one conclusion is undeniable: the relations between the big powers have still not reached a stage which would correspond to the objective world developments. Disarmament is only one vivid example of the extent to which the relations between the big powers lag behind actual international development. As for disarmament itself, the situation already enables at least some initial agreements to be negotiated; in other words, such agreements are not only possible, but even inevitable. The big powers which are primarily responsible for world peace, and hence also for the continuance or cessation of the armaments race, are no less responsible (although of course not to the same extent for the fact that nothing has been accomplished). It is of course impossible, after the London failure, to resign oneself to this state of affairs, as was usual so far, or just take note of the fact that the "big powers" have again failed to reach agreement. The problems which confront us are far too serious and pressing, the wishes of all people too strong, to allow one to wait passively for an indefinite period of time for a renewal of efforts aiming at an agreement on crucial issue which is of equal concern for big and small countries. It is therefore expected that the United Nations Disarmament Commission should improve the present situation, in other words renew the serious efforts on this problem. In this context the present debate in the Commission can and should bring about the end of the present stalemate, and — in view of the possibility for the participation of other countries — also mark a step forward.

Actually the disarmament problem marks a tragic anniversary this year, as ten years have elapsed since it was first placed on the agenda of world policy. Ever since 1946, the problem of disarmament has been included in the agenda of all General Assemblies of the United Nations. It was also discussed in other international forums within and outside of the United Nations. Like the development of international relations, the problem of disarmament

also passed through different phases, to reach a stage when agreements became really possible only during the past two years. Beginning with the session of the Sub-Committee in 1954 and the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, when an evolution of the Western and Soviet attitude enabled the initiation of serious efforts on this plane, the reconvention of the Sub-Committee in London in 1955 where the greatest rapprochement of views so far on a series of important aspects of this problem was reached, to the tenth session of the General Assembly, this year's session of the Disarmament Subcommittee etc. — parallel with the general improvement of the international climate — ever stronger hopes were pinned to this problem and agreements expected. This is not only due to the fact that the disarmament race in itself constitutes a threat to world peace, and that the maintenance of the present high level of armaments demands ever greater material sacrifices, but also to another, no less important factor. As long as solution in this field is not reached, it will not be possible to supply the necessary funds for a systematic and rapid economic advancement of vast regions throughout the world, which are economically under-developed through no fault of their own; nor will it be possible to begin closing the gap between the economically developed and under-developed parts of the world, which is becoming a paramount issue of today, and still more the immediate future of mankind. Everyday political and economic practice provides convincing proof that there can be no final pacification of international relations without the solution of this world contradiction. The sooner the serious efforts begin on this plane, with the use of the appropriate instruments, the better not only for the economically undeveloped countries, but also for this world at large. All international factors are quite aware of this, but the situation in the other fields, primarily that of disarmament, precludes all progress in this respect. There can be no doubt that this factor, together with the ever stronger international desire to negotiate an agreement in the sphere of disarmament provides a strong incentive.

During the cold war period, the nuclear aspect of disarmament afforded a suitable pretext for propaganda duels between the two antagonistic blocs. At a time marked by the liquidation of the cold war, but in which some of the old ways and methods still survive, the renewal of the attempts to use the problem of nuclear armaments and other means of mass destruction for propaganda purposes has been noted. During the last twelve months however the nuclear aspect of disarmament seems to have acquired a new framework, having apparently been left out of the framework of the disarmament programme — programme as expected by the world and unanimously adopted by the IX Session of the

United Nations General Assembly, to the effect that the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, or to be more precise the prohibition of the use, production and possession of such weapons in one of the prime objectives of the disarmament programme. The evolution of the US attitude, inaugurated by the Eisenhower "open skies" proposal at the top conference in Geneva in July 1955, and subsequently elaborated by Harold Stassen, President's special adviser on disarmament problems, and other responsible US officials, has also brought about a corresponding evolution in the attitude of the other western powers. This year's Soviet proposal to set aside, for the time being, the nuclear aspect of the problem owing to the impossibility of reaching an over-all agreement on the disarmament programme and to strive towards the achievement of a limited agreement on conventional armaments and armed forces, was also a consequence of the evolution on the other side. Although the Soviet consent to limit the field of efforts and of eventual agreements is doubtless a realistic step nearer to an agreement, and was favourably assessed in the world as such, the circumstance that in the evolution of their attitudes the big powers are, if only temporarily, inclined to avoid the issue of nuclear armaments could hardly be said to have produced a favourable impression on world public opinion, or on the governments of the "non-nuclear" countries. In its expectations of some, at least initial agreements, on other aspects of this problem, which would be invaluable both on the broader plane of international stabilization, and that of the solution of the disarmament problem, world public opinion did not react sharply to this abandonment of efforts aiming at an agreement in the sphere of nuclear armaments. However, the failure to negotiate any agreement whatever, has again assigned top priority to the nuclear aspect of disarmament, all the more so as the non-nuclear powers are even more interested in the solution of this aspect, because they would suffer most in case of nuclear war, having no adequate means of defence and retaliation.

This would lead to the problem of nuclear test explosions. The still insufficiently known effects of radiation caused by these explosions, together with the already established highly detrimental effects on human life and health uncertainty as to the spread of radiation, as well as the impossibility to achieve the necessary precision of explosions have for more than two years already stirred up the misgivings of world public opinion, particularly in regions where such experiments are being carried out. The Indian Government, with the moral support of a host of other Governments, put forward a proposal in the United Nations on the cessation of nuclear explosions already in 1954. Public opinion in favour of discontinuing nuclear tests is growing steadily, which is reflected, inter alia, in the number of proposals for their temporary or permanent limitation, abolishment or control etc. It can be said today that there are few governments which do not demand or endorse the cessation of these explosions, or at least seriously consider the possibility of their limitation. Therefore this question, together with the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces belongs to those issues, for which the conditions of solution are the most ripe.

The necessary conditions have also doubtless been created for the achievement of agreements on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. The very fact that some powers have announced, and indeed some as the Soviet Union are already implementing the unilateral reduction of their armed forces, or are resorting to similar measures, proves that it is possible to reach agreement in this field. The fact that a big power, such as the Soviet Union, has given the initiative for the unilateral reduction of its armed power, shows that matters are not stagnating where international confidence is concerned. If the Soviet Union announces that it is cutting its armed forces and is believed (on the whole) to be doing so, then there is no doubt that confidence between this power and the others is no longer at the same level as before, or in other words, that international trust has been strengthened. It is expected that the Disarmament Commission might devote some attention to this aspect of the problem at its present meeting.

The problem of disarmament control, as a stumbling block which actually hampers agreement, has been and continues to be a subject of discussion. However, the Sub-Committee session in London revealed a rapprochement of views on the subject, although differences still prevail. In this light insistence on absolute control appears as an obstacle to the efforts aiming at an agreement. The concept of control as a function of confidence, which is in fact a single process, seems the only correct solution in this sphere. The formula: neither disarmament without control, nor control without disarmament, represents the fulfilment of the more or less common desire, and the only question remains in which manner it should be realized. It is not unlikely that the present well known attitudes of the leading powers will be modified to some extent as there are prospects for a further rapprochement in this field. In the light of a realistic appraisal of the present international relations it cannot be said that the problem of priority, namely whether to approach the solution of political problems first and disarmament later or vice versa, or even to adopt another combination along the same lines, has been realistically conceived. The orientation to those questions which offer the best prospects of yielding results within the shortest possible time provides the only realist course of action which may contribute to a more rapid progress towards an agreement.

In view of the stalemate reached by the Sub-Committee in its present structure, the activation of those countries which so far did not participate directly in the discussions on disarmament has likewise become topical. While not minimizing the significance and prime responsibility of the big powers on this plane, it is both the right and duty of the other countries, to take more direct action, thus helping to bring the present deadlock to an end. The present session of the UN Disarmament Commission will doubtless enable all the aforementioned sides to the problem to be placed in the forefront of public attention, thus ending the present impasse and fulfilling the expectations of all peoples throughout the world as regards the problem of disarmament.

PROSPECTS OF EGYPT'S DEVELOPMENT

R. KESIC

THE national and political emancipation of Egypt and the personal affirmation of the man whose name became the symbol of the renaissance of this ancient country on the banks of the Nile, Gamal Abdel Nasser, were marked by two recent events of an historical significance: the departure of the last British soldier from the Suez Canal zone was solemnly celebrated on June 19, while on June 23 the Egyptian people adopted the new Constitution and elected Nasser President of the Republic. Yet another revolution has legalized its achievements, yet another country has embarked on the road of progress.

A BACKWARD DEPENDENT COUNTRY

Before July 23, 1952, when a group of young Egyptian officers decided to carry out their ideas on the creation of a new Egypt, this country was an epitome of backwardness and dependence. The life of the fellah remained unchanged through the ages: it was

exclusively contingent on the will of the wealthy feudal landowners and the changing moods of the Nile whether the poor fellah will subsist or starve. The most primitive means of production were characteristic not only for agriculture, but also for the more or less rudimentary industry, which consisted almost exclusively of cotton mills as every other type of industry was out of question. Entirely dependent on the world market conditions, the Egyptian cotton ("white gold") industry was frequently a source of subsistence wages for workers and seasonal hired labour, but also a source of the greatest misery in the years when there were no customers on the glutted cotton market. A handful of big landowners and industrialists who appropriated in the greatest part of the national income, and strove to surpass even the scenes from "A Thousand and One Nights" by their luxury and splendour, had only their own interests at heart, and were always ready to betray their country. They may be said to have vied successfully in this res-

pect with the court clique, the centre of authority and despotism and the hub of corruption and treason. Immense wealth was amassed by King Farouk, who appointed and dismissed governments according to his interests and whims over the heads of the helpless parliament. The political parties proved excellent breeding grounds for demagoguery, and while playing off the contradictions of various influential groups in the country, were frequently mere foreign agencies. Their unscrupulous struggle for power only aggravated the evils and tragic contradictions of a reality in which relations of feudalism and slavery intermingled with capitalistic elements. On the international scene, semi-colonial Egypt, at the crossroads of three continents, and vital marine, air and mainland communications, was merely an obedient pawn of the powers, a pawn whose voice was invariably ignored, even when its vital interest were at stake.

FALL OF THE MONARCHY

The fateful events which took place in the summer of 1952, heralded the advent of a new era in Egyptian history. A group of young revolutionaries, in which Nasser's strong personality was already prominent had the opportunity of gaining a first hand acquaintance with all the vices and shortcomings of the monarchist regime, in a badly equipped and corrupt army. If the expulsion of Farouk and overthrow of the monarchy which had reigned over Egypt for 148 years was the first result of their resolute and well organised action, then this proved that the exponents of the revolution, which was incipient in the land of the pharaohs, have adopted the only correct course. Time has shown that this was no ordinary coup d'état which marks a simple change of personalities not an aim in itself, as is frequently the case in certain parts of the world. This was only the beginning, the most adequate and logical beginning, of the transformation of Egyptian reality both in form and substance.

THE AIMS OF THE REVOLUTION

The resolute policy of the Revolutionary Council, in which Nasser's revolutionary talent represented the principal motive force, succeeded in overcoming numerous difficulties which confronted the exponents of the new government from the very beginning. Conflicts with political parties and personalities who enjoyed special positions in the country and foreign support, these more or less typical ebbs on the path of every revolution, actually marked the upsurge of those revolutionary tendencies which knew how to ensure their victory. If it is undeniably true that the greatest merit for the steady advancement of the revolution belongs to the efforts of its authors and the correctness of their tactics, then the programme it has proclaimed doubtless represents the most adequate explanation of its successes:

1. The liberation of Egypt from alien domination in any form whatever represents the prime objective of the revolutionary movement in the first stage of the revolution. The struggle for national rights and sovereignty of the country assumed the complexion of an action for the withdrawal of the British troops from the Suez Canal zone and the efforts to resolve the problem of Sudan, hence actually declaring war on the "vested rights" of Great Britain on Egyptian soil.

2. The low standard of living and misery of the people demand the implementation of efficient measures. In a markedly backward and agricultural country, land reform is therefore a precondition for any action in this field. The existence of hundreds

of thousands of fellahs devoid of land or with insufficient land for subsistence on the one hand, and a few feudal landowners with huge estates on the other, rendered land reform imperative, not only from the standpoint of social justice, but also as an indispensable measure aiming at the economic stabilization and progress of the country.

3. In the sphere of social and economic policy the Nasser administration declared itself against monopoly. Powerful industrial and financial groups were formerly the undisputed rulers of economic life; in virtue of their monopolistic position, they were actually a state within the state. The interests of the country and nation were never a prime consideration to the men who ruled the Egyptian economy. A revolution which is inspired by ideas of national independence and social justice must inevitably come in conflict with the forces which represented the mainstay of the old system.

4. For the leaders of the revolution, to organize, or rather create a new army which will draw its strength from its close links with the people, was to secure Egyptian independence.

5. The abolishment, in all spheres of social life and government, of the heritage of feudal absolutism which ignored the aspirations of the people and reduced constitutional rights to the rights of the court and the privileged hierarchy, is a process in which the victory of the new democratic concepts can only be ensured by resolute measures.

RESULTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

During the talks with Great Britain the leaders of the Egyptian revolution persevered in their justified demands. Relying on the Egyptian people, they forced Great Britain to effect the transition from the time-worn policy of "vested rights" to a more realistic course and be reconciled to a historical fait accompli. On February 12, 1953 the Egyptians marked a signal success: the Sudan became autonomous and acquired the right to self-determination after the lapse of a three year transition period. This historical act subsequently led to the proclamation of Sudan's independence.

The protracted talks on the Suez held no promise of a settlement at the beginning. Nevertheless, they were successfully concluded at long last. In July 1954, the two parties concerned reached an agreement in principle, while a final agreement was initiated on October 19, the same year: a) the British troops will withdraw from the Suez canal zone within a twenty month term after the signature of the agreement, b) the provisions of the 1936 Treaty on Alliance are declared null and void as the latter instrument is considered to have expired, c) in case of attack by a third foreign power on a signatory to the Joint Defence Pact of the Arab League or on Turkey, Egypt will enable Great Britain to adapt the Suez base for wartime purposes, d) the agreement is valid for a seven year period. Thus Egypt succeeded in extending its sovereign rights to the Suez canal zone and thus it became an independent country in the real sense of word.

Although it did not result in a radical levelling of ownership relations in the Egyptian countryside, land reform marked an historical undertaking without precedent in this country. A maximum holding of 200 fedans was fixed and every peasant ensured at least 4 fedans, while no one received less than two fedans. The peasants did not receive the land free of charge, but pay for it over a thirty year period at three percent annual interest. Landowners with over 200 fedans were forced to sell the surplus to smallholders, or cede it to the state against compensation in government bonds, which can be cashed in at 3% interest annually. Thus the prime objective of agrarian reform i. e. to ensure a minimum standard of living to the fellah and also to use the funds obtained by the sale of land for industrial and other investments was achieved.

The big Assuan dam project on the Nile will greatly contribute to Egyptian prosperity, and has besides a certain symbolic meaning. It is considered that the construction of this giant project will take ten to fifteen years at a cost of a billion and three hundred million dollars (of which 400 million in US dollars and 900 million in Egyptian pounds). The construction of the foundations and tunnel in the first five year stage will require 70 million dollars of foreign exchange. The remaining 330 million dollars will be expended in the second stage which will include the erection of the upper dam, the hydraulic engineering works, and irrigation system. Having very large foreign exchange requirements, Egypt was obliged to apply for foreign loans. The protracted talks with the World Bank which offered about 200 million dollars for the second stage in the construction of the Assuan dam progressed very slowly and were suspended on several occasions. The Egyptian representatives have stated that the terms stipulated by the World bank are tantamount to interference in the internal af-



fairs of the country and therefore unacceptable. This primarily refers to the demand of the World Bank to be granted insight in the Egyptian state finance and the exaggerated guarantees claimed. In the talks with the USA and Great Britain an agreement on 70 million dollars required in the first phase has been reached (USA 55 million and Great Britain 15). Consequently if a loan is granted by the World Bank, the amount of 130 million dollars would still remain outstanding. The Soviet Union was mentioned as a potential creditor, although during his recent visit to Cairo the Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov rather denied than confirmed such rumours. The Assuan dam will increase cultivable surfaces by two million fedans. National income will rise by 150 million pounds annually. These figures themselves testify eloquently enough to the significance of this project for the further progress of the country.

In the sphere of interior democratization, the decree on the abolishment of political parties was a decisive act. Many former politicians who had compromised themselves in the destructive campaign against the new regime were condemned and branded. The activities of the so-called "Moslem Brotherhood" constituted a far more serious threat to the revolutionary movement. The tolerant attitude of the new administration towards this organization, which was making use of religious fanaticism for its specific political aims, proved to be an extremely unsuitable form of "coexistence" with this problematic movement. The conspiracy against the leader of the revolution Nasser, the abortive attempt at his assassination of October 26, 1954, revealed the true aims of the Moslem Brotherhood. The organization was disbanded, and the basis for the further implementation of the programme of the Revolutionary Council in the so-called period of transition was secured.

THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW ERA

The period of transition, whose ultimate objective, in the words of president Nasser, was the creation of the necessary conditions for the introduction of constitutional and parliamentary system in Egypt lasted almost four years. The activities of the Revolutionary Council, the principal body of government, evolved precisely along the lines charted, so that President Nasser's promises on the duration of the period of transition could be successfully fulfilled. On June 23, the Egyptian people went to the polls to take part, for the first time, in a truly national referendum, and to decide, for the first time in their history, about their future development. This was also the first time in Egyptian history that women and members of the armed forces cast their vote. About five million voters were registered, of whom the overhel-

ming majority declared themselves in favour of the new constitution and voted for the first head of the state to be elected by the people, the President of the Republic Gamal Abdel Nasser. Thus Egypt has acquired a Constitution which proclaims that authority derives from the people and which is inspired by the principles of modern state organization and modern democracy.

The authority of the Revolutionary Council ceased at the same time, and Egypt is soon to have its new parliament which will consist of deputies elected under individual tickets and not as candidates of political parties.

THE IDEA OF COEXISTENCE AND THE POLITICAL PRESTIGE OF EGYPT

During the four year activities of the Revolutionary Council and President Nasser, Egypt ceased being merely a geographic term and became an active factor in international relations. The struggle for national independence in a region which for centuries past represented a sphere of interest of the big powers inevitably became an extremely significant factor. Basing her attitude on her most vital interests, Egypt declared herself categorically opposed to bloc conceptions and groupings in the Near and Middle East, viewing them as a source of disputes, misunderstandings and potential threats to peace.

In the divided Arab world, Egypt became an important political force and representative of those countries and those aspirations on African soil that constitute a prime factor of peace and international cooperation. However, the prestige of Egypt and its foreign policy, particularly after the Bandung conference, transcends the narrower geographic framework and becomes a factor of world policy. The ideas of Bandung, the ideas of coexistence, to which this country consistently adheres, and which are the motive power and inspiration of her activities on the world scene, place Egypt among those countries that have affirmed themselves as the most sincere fighters for peace and international cooperation.

It is therefore no wonder that India, Egypt and Yugoslavia, — the countries that are a symbol and an increasingly important factor in the world of today, — came together in their endeavours to ensure the victory of the principle of active coexistence. The words of President Nasser: "If Russia proffers her hand we will cooperate; if Great Britain proffers her hand we will cooperate; if the USA proffers their hand we will cooperate; but we will not accept cooperation which would be detrimental to the national interests of Egypt" — only confirm the principled and constructive character and breadth of outlook of a policy which opens clear and bright prospects to the new Egypt.

TWO GERMANYS AND THEIR UNIFICATION

K. TONČIĆ

AMONG the numerous comments and reactions called forth by the visit of President Tito to the Soviet Union, the reaction of the press, public and political circles including also those official of the Federal Republic of Germany occupies a special place both by its bulk and tone. The attitude towards the German problem which was formulated as follows in the joint declaration of the Soviet and Yugoslav Governments attracted the greatest attention and comments in Western Germany. "As for the problem of Germany, both Governments consider that, at the present moment when two new sovereign states have been formed on post-war German territory, talks between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are indispensable for the achievement of unity. They also consider that the other countries, primarily the big powers, should adopt the same course of action both in the interests of the German people and of the world in general".

All the contradictory opinions on German unity which prevail in the Federal Republic were manifested in the comments — and frequently even attacks on the attitude expressed in the "Joint

declaration". All these shades and contrasts make it necessary, as stated by the Berlin newspaper "Telegraph", to give an objective historical survey of the problem of unification. The historical facts are as follows:

Germany emerged from the war partitioned under the occupation of several victorious powers, which was not only formulated and determined but also legalized by the Potsdam Agreement. Four occupied zones, as an expression of the victorious rights of the four big powers, existed mainly as four occupied geographical regions of a united but defeated Germany. The different views of each big power on the future of Germany, the individual, often contrasting interests of each power, in exerting its authority over its respective zones, became increasingly obvious, leaving a deep and fatal imprint on the future development of Germany as a whole.

Besides, the implementation of the specific interests and combinations of every power in its zone, took place under the conditions of cold war, and it should also be recalled that these contrasting interests and policies towards Germany contributed



notably to the further aggravation and intensification of the cold war. The occupation zones drifted ever more widely apart, the frontiers between them were cleft deeper and deeper. A rapprochement of the three zones occupied by the Western powers coincided with the climax of the cold war in connection with the formation of the Western bloc opposed to the zone under Soviet occupation. The consolidation of the western bloc led to the creation of the so called "Trizonia", which was ultimately to give birth to the Federal German Republic.

Among other numerous factors, bloc tension, especially the war in Korea, US aid and the immense potential possibilities latent in the temporarily immobilized economic power of Western Germany, soon led to the "German miracle" i. e. the hitherto unprecedented rate of development in all fields of economic life, and consequent political and economic stabilization and prosperity of the Federal Republic. Relying for support on its genuine economic power the government of Western Germany, thanks to its skilful manoeuvres along the gap which divided East and West and by taking advantage of minor rifts between the Western Governments, at last succeeded in acquiring the full sovereignty of their country while also ensuring an important place in the international community. Profiting by its potential and the position it had acquired in Europe, as well as the fact that it represents more than two thirds of the German people, the Federal Government worked out its policy on the problem of unification. Tackling the problems successively, as they came up for settlement, the Federal Government elaborated its well known attitude on the obligation of the big powers to ensure the unification of Germany ("they have divided Germany-let them unite her") and bade its time. The statements of the West German Government on the problem of unification are devoid of any reference whatever to the Eastern part, which should be united, and not simply incorporated into Western Germany. Those who disagree with such views of the Bonn Government stress the following facts:

During the decade of the divided Germany, which marked such a significant progress and far reaching changes in Western Germany, life was not at a standstill in Eastern Germany either. On the contrary, great and far reaching changes occurred there: the changes which whether recognised or not, inevitably influence, not only the relations between the two parts of Germany but also the future prospects of unification. The frontier between the two parts of Germany is no longer only a territorial and administrative border between parts of one and the same Germany ruled by different occupying powers. Today this is a state frontier between two countries which have in common only that they are inhabited by the same people, that they were long ago a homogeneous entity, and the common efforts and wishes to be reunited again. Everything else divides them.

Politically, in the present situation marked by the existence of blocs, they are two worlds apart; and according to the logic of development in a divided world, their very consolidation widens the gap between them. It is sufficient in this context to call attention to the rôle of the rapid formation of their armies.

Economically, in the present bloc situation East and West Germany are also two worlds apart. East German economy, whose potential and development it would be a great mistake to underestimate, even from the standpoint of general European standards, was reconstructed and developed within the closed economic com-

plex of the Eastern countries. In this context, inter alia, the policy of economic embargo which closed the vast Eastern markets, a traditional outlet for German sales, to the economic power of Western Germany, proved very favourable to the East German economy.

Socially, these are also two sharply divided worlds. The nationalization, land reform and other measures aiming at the creation of the basis for the building up of a socialist system, have widened the gap between the two Germanys. The socialist orientation, although so far having failed, owing to many objective reasons, to yield the expected tangible results has nonetheless created solid foundations enabling Eastern Germany to boldly approach its great objective of competing with the achievements and standard of living of their brothers in the West, under more favourable conditions.

Ten years of separation and different ways of life have left their imprint in all domains, and this is gradually becoming one of the principal obstacles on the road to unity. However strange this statement may sound, this conclusion is gaining increasing currency in spite of such facts as the big power conference on the German problem etc. The existence of two Germanys is an irrefutable fact today, which is not based, as is often wrongly believed in Bonn, on the fact that both German states have all, absolutely all the elements necessary for the recognition of sovereignty to a country. There are no grounds, in any constitutional law, for denying the sovereignty of either Germany from the legal point of view. But this is only one element — a legal element at that — for the existence of two Germanys, neither essential nor decisive in itself. The reality of the steadily growing general social, economic, cultural etc. division and differences between the two Germanys is far more important.

It would be hard to merge the two differently formed bodies on the one time German territory today, as this would require a long process of gradual acquaintance, contacts, exchange of views and experience. It is necessary to find a common basis for further development through this process of acquaintance and coordination. And this is a long drawn-out process, which if delayed, becomes even more complicated. It is incomprehensible that those who speak of unity do not realize the need to create the preconditions for unity. Refusal to see this, inevitably leads to the conclusion, that the term unity actually implies incorporation.

The recognition or non-recognition of Eastern Germany is not a vital element; it is important, if one sincerely wishes to promote the unification of Germany, to recognize the reality and draw the obvious conclusions. The problem of German unification, as stressed in the joint statement of the two governments, is not a problem of interests for the Germans only, but a problem of immense general interest; it is therefore difficult to understand the persistent policy of denial of reality and the rejection of one among the most realistic approaches to the German problem, a policy which is rightly criticized by the opposition groups as "neglecting the fundamental problem on German unification to its narrow political interests and combinations".



CYPRUS IN BRITISH POLICY

J. GUSTINČIĆ

THE British policy in Cyprus could hardly be explained by the political situation on the island, i. e. by the internal difficulties or the possibilities of which the British could have availed themselves — until recently at least. In fact, an agreement between Field Marshal Harding and that capable politician Archbishop Makarios, head of the Cyprus ethnarchy seemed more or less certain in the spring. Even in the most difficult issue — the question of self-determination — the Greek Cypriots were satisfied with the British recognition of the general principle. However, agreement became impossible at the last moment, owing to the limitations the British authorities had imposed on the development of home-rule. These restrictions were so severe that the realization of the right to self-determination, even in the remote future, was brought in question: according to these provisions the Cyprus Assembly would not be composed proportionately, as a large number of deputies would be appointed, thus automatically ensuring a parliamentary pro-British majority, while the security service would exclusively be reserved for the British.

In similar cases in Asia and Africa, the chief British argument consisted in the incapability of the native population of assuming all the responsibilities of self-government. It was alleged, and this is still frequently repeated, that a certain period of time, often very long, must elapse before the natives can learn the art of government, and that throughout that period the British colonial authorities should play the role of not only administrative but also "educational" factors. This argument was particularly frequently used in Kenya, where, like in Cyprus, the struggle for self-determination assumed broad proportions, flaring up in armed revolt.

In Cyprus the formula of immaturity would have been useless, as a highly civilized, so to speak "European" population, with age old cultural traditions, and great intellectual abilities was in question. Besides their high cultural level, the inhabitants of Cyprus speak the language of a nation which occupies an important part of the Southeastern Mediterranean. Recourse to the formula of a "period of transition" would therefore have been futile.

But this situation, apparently, was not the only reason for the abandonment of this formula by the British and for the vagueness of their promises to grant the right of self-determination to the people, (although they do not reject it in theory). The real reasons for the extreme unwillingness of the British to cooperate, displayed from the very beginning, and for the rigid measures to which they are resorting at present for the maintenance of colonial rule on the island: should, of course, be sought in the broader conceptions of British policy in that part of the world. Finding impossible to apply the formula of the need for a period of transition, the British representatives themselves no longer conceal the actual reasons underlying their conduct; on the contrary, they have begun — as Sir Anthony Eden himself did a couple of weeks ago — more and more openly to state them in support of their present policy in Cyprus.

It was precisely because of this shift of stress to the international aspect of the problem, that the Cypriot struggle for self-government was so intensified. The negotiations which were necessarily restricted to a considerably limited and undemocratic home rule, became unacceptable even to the so-called liberal group — in which Archbishop Makarios himself may be numbered — so that the present violent resistance was inevitable.

As for the international considerations underlying the British insistence to remain in Cyprus their justification has been undermined by the changes in the arguments used. Until the end of May this year, the British policy was being defended by the needs of so-called military and defensive strategy, with particular reference both to the "danger of aggression from the East" and to the Arab—Israeli dispute. In relation to the "danger from the East", Cyprus — whose importance was only enhanced after the loss of Suez — was essential as a base, from which it would be possible to extend effective support to the military machinery of

the Baghdad Pact and other important political positions from the British point of view. And in as far as the Arab—Israeli dispute was concerned, Cyprus appeared as an important air-force base within the so-called security system provided for by the Tripartite Declaration of the Western Powers in case the truce in Palestine were violated by a new conflict.

Insistence on these explications is tinged with a good deal of uncertainty of late, which is quite understandable. The vast majority of the Arab public opinion has rejected the Baghdad Pact, as devoid of any "general value". The United States, which at one time was enthusiastic about the idea of the Pact, no longer wishes to join it formally. Furthermore, the representatives of the Arab world are extremely doubtful as to the value of the Tripartite Declaration, which they consider as a means of ensuring Western military control over the Near and Middle East. Even in Israel the tendencies in favour of a broader outlook, of a policy which would not depend exclusively on the element of Western "aerial realisation" are steadily gaining ground. At any rate, the implementation of such security measures would always depend on the prevailing international situation, and cannot therefore be considered absolute.

The explanation that Cyprus is essential as an "air police base" has become so unconvincing that even the British Premier recently considered it necessary to define the British interests in this area, and, hence, also in Cyprus. The real thing is the importance of Middle East and the adjacent positions from the standpoint of control over the oilfields in this area. Owing to these oilfields and their importance for the whole "western world", Britain must retain the military bases such as Cyprus. Only the development of the atomic industry and atomic warfare, which will reduce the importance of such bases, will enable Great Britain to gradually abandon the vital points in the Near and Middle East. According to these arguments, the granting to Cyprus of the right to self-determination or even a more liberal system of home rule, has been postponed for a very long period, since it is not known, first, when atomic technology will be in a position to do away with oil altogether, and, secondly, whether atomic weapons will ever render conventional arm and conventional military bases unnecessary.

Consequently, the entire defence theory of British policy is reduced to economic interests. However, now that the Middle East is emancipating itself economically, economic interests have lost much of their stability. This is well known to the politicians of the Levant and to men like Archbishop Makarios and his associates. The firmness of these men can best be explained by their conviction that none of the British positions is quite firm, and that we are living in an age of constant change. It is therefore understandable that a policy outside of NATO is far more frequently discussed in Cyprus than in Athens, for instance.



LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD AND IN YUGOSLAVIA

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AS an institution of the political system of an individual people, which allows maximum scope for the self-determination of citizens in local communities, and ensures their freedom to deliberate directly or indirectly on the affairs of the commune, district, region, city etc. local self-government is not always of the same origin and form nor is it invested with an identical social and political substance in different countries. In this field of its organization, as in any other, human society does not develop according to ready made clichés or along a straight line, according to an "optimum" and rational plan. Hence all theoretical generalizations and comparisons in the sphere of local self-government are difficult and full of pitfalls, if they do not rely on and recognize the living practice and its wealth of different forms, and if they are not contented with the establishment of the individual situations, trends and tendencies, which ensue from the level of the general socio-political and ideological development of individual peoples.

Besides, local self-government never had the same forms or the same social or political significance in the history of an individual country. The French system of self-government at the time of the Revolution of 1789 and until the establishment of Napoleonic centralism was not the same as that established by the consolidated bourgeoisie under the III Republic and which has been preserved more or less until today. For a long time British local self-government constituted a form of government by the medium and minor nobility, as a defence from absolutism, monarchy and the highest feudal strata. Later on it represented the rule of the merchant and guild aristocracy, only to become self-government in the modern democratic sense of the word after the introduction of universal suffrage and the advent and influence of the working class. The same differences are found between local self-government in Belgium and Holland in the middle of the XIX century and its present forms. Local self-government in rural America (until the seventies of the last century) which was praised by Marx and Engels, is not identical with the present US rural self-government, although more or less unchanged in form, and has still less in common with the new urban self-government in the big American cities.

There exist however certain general and common forms of local self-government, just as there are certain general tendencies in their development and general conceptions as to their place and role. These general and common characteristics are an inevitable result of the laws of social development. These laws express certain necessities ensuring from those social forces and relations that give its form, its substance and motion to any structure of social reality.

These objective social relations and forces inevitably include the status and rôle of people in production and consumption (the problem of property over the means of production and the influence of people on the appropriation and distribution of social

products), classes and class contradictions which appear on that basis, the place of man in the sphere of authority and public affairs (political systems and the role of politics in general, as well as the general level of the material and spiritual development of a country).

Those objective laws of social development enable the existence of science and hence the deduction of certain conclusions with regard to the differences, similarities and value of a social institution such as local self-government. In point of fact there is no such thing as the "state in general" or "local self-government in general". Actually there only exist the individual states as Great Britain, the USA, France, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia etc. and concrete systems of local self-government within them. Objectively however, we encounter greater or smaller differences or resemblances between the individual states and systems of local self-government, not only in their forms but also in the social relations and the socio-political forces which give the political institutions their real substance and significance. It is true that certain generalizations, which are inevitable when determining these general differences and resemblances, are incapable of expressing all that is concrete and specific, but they acquire a scientific value in so far as they are capable of discovering the general i. e. the common or different characteristics in the concrete.

Notwithstanding all differences and specificities of the different forms of self-government in the world of today, it is possible to establish two basic forms.

The one is the decentralized type of self-government and the other is that of local government.

The French municipality and "département" are the examples of the former (so that this form of self-government is referred to in French political science and law rather as decentralization than autonomy). With greater or smaller deviations, this form of self-government prevails in most countries of Western Europe. Local self-government in the Anglo-Saxon countries, Great Britain and the USA belongs to the other type.

Two elementary premises of autonomy are indeed characteristic for both these forms, premises without which the former could not be considered as self-government at all. The first premise lies in the right of citizens to directly elect councils or similar representative bodies as their organs of authority. The second consists in the existence of a certain independent scope of competence, at least in "local affairs", and a certain, if minimum, degree of financial independence.

The essential differences between these two forms lie in the position of local self-government. According to the French dispensation, local self-government is an integral part of a basically centralistic government and legal system, and is consequently subject to a certain amount of "administrative tutelage". Administrative tutelage is manifested in various forms in different

countries, and even differently in the same country in the many spheres of relations between autonomous and central authority. It is however, essential that a representative of the central authority should be present on the territory of local self-government, where he carries out the functions of the "state" and the functions of direct control over local self-government, or even takes part in the very structure of local self-government. The crudest form of administrative tutelage is its implementation by the prefect or governor as the highest representative of central authority on territories with local self-government, or the appointment by the government of a mayor who is at the same time the executive organ of self-government and the representative of the central authority both in the local community and in the self-governing territory. The election of the mayor by the local population and his investment with the functions of a representative of central authority under the law (as in the French commune) is a more flexible and decentralized form.

The other system provides for a principled and legal delimitation between the different forms of authority. In Britain distinction is made between the national government or "state" on the one hand, and local self-government on the other. Along with the Federal government in the USA there are also local governments as "states" and various forms of urban and local government. These governments are independent and specific to their territories within the framework of their functions and rights. In the local self-government there are no representatives of the central or higher authority in any form whatever, and it is in principle and legally outside of the general system of administrative tutelage and general administrative control.

The later form of democracy is more democratic in principle and is closer to the concept of autonomy. It is a result of democratic traditions and forces which led to its formation. It is true that differences between these two forms begin to fade at present. Within the framework of the constitutional provisions on the relative independence of local self-government on its territory, and within the framework of its rights, economic development which results in the solid integration of extensive territories, the advancement of modern technology and other factors of political and social centralism, create new, even administrative rights of the central authority towards the local self-government. The system of subsidies and other forms of assistance obliges local self-government, which is invariably deficient in all countries, to accept various kinds of control, influence and interference which hardly anyone would have dared to propose in the period of liberal capitalism, and even a few decades ago.

By its form local self-government in Yugoslavia belongs to the second type. From the very beginning Yugoslav self-government was an independent form in the uncompounded system of authority of the working people. Apart from the authority of the Federation and the people's republic, there is also the autonomous authority of the district and municipality. The first Federal Law on People's Committees of 1946 stipulates that citizens represen-

tative bodies in the district and municipality "are the highest organs of authority on their territory within the framework of the rights and duties vested in them by the Constitution and laws". This is understandable, because local self-government is not only the creation of progressive social forces which assume power in the socialist revolution, but the people's committees were also created as the basis of the new government system in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was constituted, in fact and legally, (as seen from the decisions of the II session of the Antifascist Council of Liberation AVNOJ of 1943) on the basis of the people's committees, as a "committees type" republic, if we may say so. The subsequent Yugoslav socio-political and constitutional development enabled the status of the people's committees to be defined with still greater clarity. The new position of the self-governing municipality and district was laid down by the Constitutional Law of 1953 and later in the process of the organizational and legal changes implemented in the second half of 1955 and commonly referred to as the "establishment of the communal system". These changes have also brought about an increasingly obvious difference between the classic local self-government of the Anglo-Saxon type, and Yugoslav self-government today.

The emphasis on its legal, artificial and derived character is a common feature of British and US local self-government. British self-government is "the work of Parliament and a creation of law". US local self-government is "the creation and organization of the states". This is an absolute premise of British and US constitutional law, and an unquestioned political philosophy of local self-government in these countries. The British Parliament and Congress of US states create self-government by transferring certain of their rights to the organs of the local community, elected by the local population. It is logical that these representative organs can revoke these rights at any time, and eventually abolish self-government. Owing to the considerable amount of abuse on the part of the individual American states in the exercise of their absolute rights, constitutions were brought in some of them, which guaranteed a minimum of autonomy to the US cities. Needless to say, the question of genuine self-government is a factual and political, not a legal problem. Whether the British Parliament and the US Congress will deprive the people of local self-government does not depend primarily on its rights but on the objective balance of power, as well as political and other objective factors.

Such position of local self-government in Britain and the USA calls forth a series of significant consequences; both legal and political, with regard to the scope, strength and role of local self-government. On the other hand, this concept of local self-government does not only reflect a specific political philosophy but also a given form of government and social system prevailing in these countries. It may be said that the concept of the position of local self-government may be traced to the democratization of the feudal idea on the origin of local self-government. Local self-government was created on the basis of "rights bestowed" on the part of the monarch. In Britain city councils were "incorporated" on the basis of a charter issued by the monarch. This idea had also been transferred to America, but it acquired another meaning there. However; the concept of local self-government as a creation of parliament and law is a class idea which coincides with the interests and political philosophy of the bourgeoisie, as the first architect of local self-government in the world. Essentially the bourgeoisie never created a state of democracy for all, but only for itself and according to its ideas. The same applies to local self-government. The bourgeoisie built its state under conditions of violent class, political and ideological struggle, not only against the feudalists but also against the unsatisfied plebeian masses and later against the worker's class. Hence the bourgeois state and democracy is primarily of a representative nature, with strong absolutist and centralist overtones. Absolutism and centralism are present in every state organization, regardless of whether the respective dispensation



provides for decentralization, federalism and local self-government. This characteristic is immanent in the social phenomenon of etatism. Only those classes and social movements that objectively strive towards the abolishment of their own rule and hence also towards the gradual transformation, i. e. "withering away of etatism" can gradually change, weaken and abolish all the immanent characteristics of etatism.

Accordingly it is both logical and understandable that local self-government in Great Britain and the USA should be interpreted as a creation of parliament and the states and that the political and constitutional rights of the citizens in local communities to a certain immanent autonomy are being denied.

The political philosophy which determined the concept of etatism and hence that of local self-government in Yugoslavia is essentially different from the political philosophy which determined the position of local self-government in Britain, the USA and other countries with more or less identical systems of local self-government. The Yugoslav constitutional system is based on social ownership over the means of production, the producers' self-management in economy and the self-government by the working people in the local communities. The exponent of sovereignty is not the Parliament as in Britain, or the individual state as in America, but the working people and citizens. *The citizen does not acquire his rights, he has them.* They belong to him because, as stressed by Marx, the restitution of the human personality to Man has been initiated, primarily the restitution of his dignity and of the rights vested in him as a producer and those which he must possess in order to become the manager of the common social affairs. The essence of the restitution of the politically alienated human individuality to the socialist man lies in the change of his attitude towards the means of production, his participation in the distribution of the social product and his status in the mechanism of social management. The producer has acquired the right to self-management in economy which is actually based on the social means of production. Self-management in economy ensures his participation in the appropriation of a certain part of the social product and the deliberation on the distribution and utilization of social funds (through the producers' councils as the houses of the representative bodies of the country). At the same time the producers and other citizens who take active part in the transformation and creation of new social relations and socialist society are invested with a new democratic right which is referred to as "people's self-government" by Yugoslav Constitutional Law and which is an individual right of the citizens.

Such political and social basis necessarily alters the concept of the state, democracy, law and hence also local self-government.

The state does not create institutions and laws but expresses them and models, them appropriately. The basis of the state does not lie in the right to issue orders, but in the sovereignty of the increasingly free man. The state is transformed into a special political organization, representing the mechanism of social management in which etatism with its immanent characteristics is simultaneously reflected and transformed, in accordance with the material and spiritual development of the country and the actual establishment of new socialist relations, i. e. relations freed from elementary class contradictions, from exploitation of man by his fellow man and other sources and means of alienation of man from his fundamental role of a free and interested producer and conscious and active manager of social and public affairs.

Democracy is indispensable in these social relations but it is changing and becoming an increasingly socialist, i. e. direct democracy, the self-management of men over things and not the rule of men over their fellow men through representative institutions as the only instrument expressing the people's sovereignty. The political organizations themselves change their role and the classical party system loses its character of a more or less centralized machine, in order to become an association of men with identical



views, of the most conscious forces which are capable of organizing by means of consent, of enlisting by means of persuasion, thus converting the public cause into the common cause, instead of the "plunder of the victors". Needless to say, an appropriate influence of government organization and political centralism, as a guarantee against the predominance of backwardness, random tendencies and conservatism which inevitably appear when society still needs the state and policy, is still necessary, in accordance with the material development of socialism and the level of consciousness of the people.

The laws and objective law are not a source of rights, but their objectivized system, a mechanism for the gauging and distribution of various subjective and collective rights, a confirmation and guarantee of the level of autonomy and self-government reached by collectives, organizations and individuals.

In such a social and political system, self-government is not an "inferior" organisation of government administration created by laws and derived from above. It is the basis of the political system and state apparatus. This particularly applies to the commune as the elementary socio-economic community. As stated in the Yugoslav Law on the Organization of Districts and Municipalities, the commune is the "elementary organization of self-government of the working people", the basic cell of the social and economic system of the country. The commune and to an appropriate extent the district are invested with both the elementary local as well as all other functions involved in the management of social affairs which are realized through the state organism, in so far as certain functions are not assigned by Constitution and laws to the Federation, people's republic, or district.

Yugoslav local self-government is not a creation of the law or some other higher authority. It is the basic institution which expresses and confirms the self-government of citizens as their inalienable and immanent right. It is a constitutional category, guaranteed by the Constitution, as is the case in some other countries. But it is not the creation of some higher law, constitutional or natural law of the individual as a human being. The basis of self-government in Yugoslavia, as well as that of the Federation and people's republic lies in citizens' self-government, in their sovereign right to manage social affairs through their representative bodies and directly, in so far as they do not transfer certain government functions to the Federation and People's Republic. The reality of this law and the scope of local self-government do not ensue exclusively from the democratic machinery of autonomy but from the substance of the fundamental social relations, or to be more precise from the structure and character of the commune not only as a geographical and living community, but as a cell of socialist society. With the restitution of their primordial rights to deliberate in the economic and political sphere, with the abolition of private and social capitalist ownership over the means of production and of class selfishness, the producer and citizen create new relations of solidarity and community.

Consequently, the Yugoslav municipality, as an organization of self-government is at the same time the basis of the whole me-

chanism of political and local self-government in a social community, in which due to the "liberation of work" (Marx) new relations of solidarity, social contacts, and more genuine common interests are being created than was possible under conditions of self-government in a society based on class ownership relations, however broad its democratic form and the scope of its autonomous powers. Hence the Yugoslav municipality is beginning to radically differ from a series of other forms of self-government. Therefore, the very term of local self-government is not entirely accurate when applied to a new form of government in a relatively novel political and social structure which, through homogeneity and human freedom, infuses new vigour in the system of self-government.

It is true that it would be unfounded and unscientific to conclude that all the material and political elements of the socialist commune have already been created in Yugoslavia. In the same way the Yugoslav communal system cannot be contrasted to the other forms of local self-government as a final and qualitatively different system of administration.

The transformation of the structure of the self-governing community is under way in many countries, just as the transformation of ownership and social relations is a universal phenomenon in contemporary society. In a series of countries, such as Sweden, Norway, Great Britain and even America there are socialist forms not only in the management of the public services, but also in the property used for the organisation and functioning of a series of public institutions and utilities. "Municipal socialism" constituted the first germ of socialism within the capitalist tissue. Consequently, the relationship between the Yugoslav commune and other self-governing local communities may be considered within the context of different levels and forms local autonomy in modern society which is undergoing a series of radical transformations and transitions into new social structures. The very forms of statist self-government cannot check all the objective economic and social changes which characterize the present level of the material and political development of human society. These changes are deeper and more obvious in the Yugoslav commune. Apart from this, the political forms and general concepts of local self-government are consciously based on new social and political relations.

The democratic traditions of local self-government in the world which were retained in a series of countries resulted in two characteristic features in the organization of local self-government. Local self-government requires the combination of representative institutions and direct forms of government. It is an organization

of authority which affords maximum scope to direct and indirect democracy. It was indeed born in direct democracy. On the other hand, local self-government is never an absolute system, i. e. besides the organs of general local self-government "functional self-government" always existed and continues to exist in a series of countries. This is characteristic of the formerly most developed system of local self-government (in Great Britain, the USA etc.). Some of these democratic forms (elective officials, referendums, directly elected school boards, roads and health service committees etc. in the USA, the police committees in Britain) are unsurpassed to date in modern self-government (including the Yugoslav).

Yugoslav self-government adopts these forms of government and develops them. In most western countries direct forms of government are being abandoned and only their representative forms are retained. Apart from this, in a series of countries the representative forms are being replaced by certain forms of concentrated and centralized self-government in which individual organs and the decisive role of the technical services and administration predominate. This is particularly characteristic for the USA after the introduction of the so called commission management or city management plan, which has replaced the conventional Anglo-Saxon type of self-government by councils as the fundamental institution of government. The influence of functional self-government ceases and the number of its forms and institutions is reduced. Generally speaking, the tendencies of statism and centralized administrative government predominate; these weaken the influence of direct and functional self-government (which may imply social management) and tend to do away with them. This has its counterpart in other tendencies which are contrary to statism and centralized administrative management. Social and political forces which defend the existing democratic forms of self-government and create new ones also exist within the framework of traditional self-government in a society which retains its capitalist basis and forms. In local self-government the creative power of the active working masses shows its vitality and resilience as well as ability to transform and defend democracy and self-government.

In the Yugoslav socialist commune, direct government and various forms of social management show a tendency of perpetual growth and expansion. One of the prime features of socialist self-government lies in the fact that it is necessarily a system of representative and direct democracy, an organization of authority and of social management. Such political organism of local self-government corresponds to the socio-economic structure of the commune and represents one of its vital characteristics.



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